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RECENT DECISIONS

faith and credit or possibly, violation of due process,80 merit serious
consideration.

CONTRACTS-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF BUILDING CONTRACTARBITER'S AWARD OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CONFIRMED BY COURT.

Appellant construction company agreed to erect a five million dollar
building upon its own land for subsequent rental to respondent.
The contract provided for arbitration of all disputes and empowered
the arbiter to grant specific performance. The Court of Appeals,
affirming the confirmation of an award of specific performance, held
that the Supreme Court had acted properly in confirming the award,
since, had this matter appeared directly before the court in a suit
requesting equitable relief, the court would not have abused its
discretion by granting specific performance under the facts of the
case. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d
133, 168 N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960).
The Grayson-Robinson case bears a striking resemblance to the
hotly-discussed Matter of Staklinski,' in which the Court of Appeals
confirmed an arbitration award of specific performance which required an employer to continue in its service an officer whom it
considered disabled. Both cases came before the court as arbitration awards of specific performance requiring confirmation. Both
awards granted affirmative relief in areas where courts of equity
have traditionally declined to do so. Both were confirmed by a
sharply divided court. In Matter of Staklinski the plaintiff received from the court only what he requested--confirmation, nothing more, nothing less. There was not the slightest suggestion
that if the merits had appeared originally before the court the
result would have been the same.2 The majority opinion in
Grayson-Robinson, however, would appear to contain a far different
implication. Chief Judge Desmond states that:
[A]ssuming that the equity court in an original suit would have discretion to
refuse specific performance, and even making the" very large assumption that
Compare
30 See generally Goovaicn, CoNFicT oF LAws 242-44 (1949).
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), in which the Supreme Court
held that two New York corporations were deprived of property without due

process, where Texas had applied a statute which imposed a greater obligation
than the one agreed upon by the parties in a contract made and to be performed outside of Texas.
See 34 ST.
'6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
JonN's L. REv. 293 (1960).
2 Matter of Staklinski, supra note 1, at 163-64, 160 N.E.2d at 80, 188
N.Y.S2d at 543.
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the court would have similar discretionary power to refuse to confirm this
award, it remains that such discretion, if any, was exercised the other way3
in this case. . . That exercise of discretion was justified on the facts.

If the tone of this opinion is what it seems to be, it seems likely that
one of the most venerable rules of equity is breathing its last in
New York.
One of the well-settled principles of equity has been that the
courts, as a general rule, will not order specific performance of a
building contract.4 Judicial reluctance to command affirmative relief
in this area is typical of the attitude of the courts towards all agreements involving -the execution or performance of a continuous series
of acts demanding the exercise of one party's individual skill, discretion, taste or talent--of necessity incapable of judicial supervision or control.5
It has often been said of the ancient common-law writs that
although we .have abolished them, they rule us from the grave.
This observation might readily be applied to equity's aversion to
granting specific performance in the area of construction contracts.
As Dean Pound has observed, 6 this attitude is a product of the
tenuous position which equity occupied soon after its inception in
England. Surrounded by hostility from the long-established courts
of law, the chancellor had to be very certain that every order which
he made could be enforced, lest the dignity of the equity court be
endangered. 7 As a result, equity became extremely reluctant to
issue an order the execution of which involved more than a single
act, since the court could not, "by its ordinary means and instrumentalities carry out the decree where such continued super-

3 Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y2d 133, 138,
168 N.E.2d 377, 379, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303, 307 (1960).
4 See, e.g., Conger v. West Shore & Buffalo R.R., 120 N.Y. 29, 23 N.E. 983
(1890); Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366 (1874); Queens Plaza Amusements,
Inc. v. Queens Bridge Realty Corp., 22 Misc. 2d 315, 36 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1942),
rezfd on other grounds, 265 App. Div. 1057, 39 N.Y.S.2d 463 (2d Dep't 1943)
(memorandum decision); McCormick v. Proprietors of Cemetery of Mt.
Auburn, 285 Mass. 548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934); Fiedler, Inc. v. Coast Fin. Co.,
129 N.J.Eq. 161, 18 A.2d 268 (1941); Edison Illuminating Co. v. Eastern
Pa. Power Co., 253 Pa. 457, 98 Atl. 652 (1916) (dictum). See also 5 CoRBxn,
CoNTRAcrs §§ 1171-72 (1951); 5 WiusoN, CoNmAcrs § 1423 (rev. ed.
1937); PoMRmoY, SpEciFIc PERFORMANCE OF CNTRACrS §23 (3d ed. 1926).
5 Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157 N.Y. 66, 51 N.E. 409
(1898).; Stern v. Fremont Acres, 107 N.Y.S2d 810 (1951); McCormick v.
Proprietors of Cemetery of Mt. Auburn, 285 Mass. 548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934);
Sword
v. Aird, 306 Mich. 14, 9 N.W.2d 907 (1943).
6
Pound, The Progress of The Law-Equity, 33 HARv. L. REv. 420, 434
(1920). See Oleck, Specific Performance of Builders' Contracts, 21 FORDHAM
L. Rv. 156 (1952).
7Ibid.
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vision is required." 8 Once established, "the old notion, intrenched
in textbooks and encyclopedias, dies hard." 9
Beck v. Allison,'0 decided in New York in 1874, left no doubt
as to the position of American courts in this area. In refusing a
petition for specific performance of a contract which involved the
repair of a building, the court stated that:
[I]t is obvious that the execution of contracts of this description, under the
supervision and control of the court, would be found very difficult if not
impracticable, while the remedy at law would, in nearly . . . all cases,

afford full redress for the injury. It is for these reasons that such powers
have never been exercised in this country.,

With some minor exceptions,' 2 the rule against granting specific
performance where extended supervision was required went unchallenged until the landmark case of Jones v. Parker's in 1895.
In that case, Judge Holmes ordered specific performance of a
contract providing for the installation of lighting and heating apparatus, declaring that "there is no universal rule that courts of
equity never will enforce a contract which requires some building
to be done. They have 4enforced such contracts from the earliest
days to the present time.'
The decision in the Jones case was founded upon the belief
that "the difference between the plaintiff and the defendants . . .
lies within a narrow compass, and . . . can be adjusted by the
court." 15 This was a significant comment, since it recognized that
where there was an objective standard capable of determination and
application, it would be no great hardship for the court to order
specific performance. 6 It is this element of certainty in the contract which provided one of the well-established exceptions to the
general rule.' 7 As Professor Pomeroy indicated in his work on
specific performance,' 8 a petition for affirmative relief will generally
be granted where the agreement for erecting a building is in its
8 Pound, supra note 6, at 434.

9Ibid.

1056 N.Y. 366 (1874).
1"Id. at 370-71 (emphasis added). But see Stuyvesant v. The Mayor, 11
Paige 414 (N.Y. Ch. 1845).
22 Post V. West Shore R.R., 123 N.Y. 580, 26 N.E. 7 (1890)
(build railroad crossing); Lawrence v. Saratoga Lake Ry., 36 Hun 467 (N.Y. 3d Dep't
1885) (build a bridge); Jones v. Seligman, 81 N.Y. 190 (1880) (erect a
fence). For other cases, see 5 WiLLISTON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3977
n.3.
But cf. Fiedler, Inc. v. Coast Fin.
'3 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895).
Co., 129 N.J.Eq. 161, 18 A.2d 268 (1941).
14 Jones v. Parker, supra note 13, at -, 40 N.E. at 1045.

5Ilbid.

16 Pound, The Progress of the Law-Equity, 33 HARv. L. REv. 434 (1920).
17 PoM.oY, SPEcIFIC PE2FORMANCE OF CoNTRAcrs § 23 (3d ed. 1926).

Is Ibid.
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nature defined, 19 or the defendant has control of the land upon
which the construction is to take place, and the plaintiff has a
material interest in the performance which is not susceptible of
adequate compensation in damages. 20 Professor Corbin seems to
be of the opinion that these alleged exceptions 21 to the general
rule amount to nothing more than the fact that "some courts are
more liberal than others in their willingness to decree specific
performance and less fearful of difficulties." 22 Indeed, the modern
test would seem to be whether the potential problems of supervision are so onerous as to outweigh the merits of the petition, 23 or,
as the Restatement of Contracts declares, "when the plaintiff's need
is great . . . or the public interest is involved, the court does24 not

shrink from the difficulties involved in continued supervision.
There can be no doubt that the tendency in modern litigation
is to grant affirmative relief where a building contract is reasonably
defined and the petitioner is without an adequate remedy at law.2 5

Perhaps the most vigorous statement of this inclination can be found
in Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle Co. v. Hartford-FairmontCo.,2 6 where

the court stated that "everything depends on how insistently the
justice of the case demands the court's assumptions of difficult,
unfamiliar, and contentious . . . problems. The tendency of the
times is to 'take on' harder and longer jobs." 27 Though the

general rule against undertaking extensive supervision remains in
the textbooks and encyclopedias, we may well be near the time when
all building contracts, with the exception of those which are too
uncertain or where the petitioner has an adequate remedy at law,
will be specifically enforced.
The principal case raises some interesting questions. It is
generally recognized, for instance, that the rule against a court's
undertaking extensive supervision is one of discretion, not a lim-

'9 See, e.g., Southern Pine Fibre Co. v. North Augusta Land Co., 50 Fed.
26 (C.C.D. S.C. 1892); Lawrence v. Saratoga Lake Ry., 36 Hun 367 (N.Y.
1885); Lane v. Pacific & I. N. Ry., 8 Idaho 230, 67 Pac. 656 (1902);
Zygmunt v. Avenue Realty Co., 108 N.J.Eq. 462, 155 Atl. 544 (1931);
Murray v. Northwestern R.R., 64 S.C. 520, 42 S.E. 617 (1902).
20 See, e.g., Doty v. Rensselaer County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 194 App. Div.
841, 185 N.Y. Supp. 468 (3d Dep't 1921) ; Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach,
187 App. Div. 876, 176 N.Y. Supp. 447 (2d Dep't 1919) ; Laurel Realty Co. v.
Himelfarb, 191 Md. 462, 62 A.2d 263 (1948); Brummel v. Clifton Realty
Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 Atl. 905 (1924); McDonough v. Southern Ore. Mining
Co., 177 Ore. 136, 159 P.2d 835 (1945).
21 5 CoRBiN, CoNTRAcrs § 1172, at 747 (1951).
22 Ibid.
23 5 WImmISToN, CwmAcTs § 1423 (rev. ed. 1937).
24 RE TA'TEmENT, CONRAcrs § 371, comment a (1932).
25 5 Wiu.isToN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 3977.
26 1 F.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
27 Id. at 319-20.
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itation on jurisdiction.2 8 Whether or not specific performance of a
building contract would be granted was always a question of
degree, which involved a weighing of the inconvenience to the court
as against the particular merits of the petition. It seems clear that
to order the installation of heating and lighting apparatus 29 is one
thing; to command the construction of a modern building estimated
to cost five million dollars is quite another.8 0 As Judge Van Voorhis
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "the decision. in the present
case lends the enforcement machinery of the courts, to implement
specific performance... beyond any equitable relief which the courts
have heretofore granted. . .. ." 31 It may well be asked whether
the decision to confirm an award of this magnitude has not all but
erased the "degree of supervision required" as a factor to be considered in passing on the merits of any particular petition.
The more important question is whether the Court in the
present case had the discretionary power to refuse a confirmation
of an arbitration award of specific performance. Chief Judge Desmond,
in writing the majority opinion, indicated that it would be "making
[a] very large assumption" 32 to answer in the affirmative. The
confirmation of the award might easily have been explained by
pointing out that the contract in question was reasonably defined,
that the defendant was in control of the land upon which the building was to be erected, and that petitioner was without an adequate
remedy at law; in short, that this petition was well within the
settled exceptions to the general rule.33 The Court, however, chose
to emphasize that a refusal to confirm the award would be "contrary to the command of- Article 84 of the .Civil Practice Act." 34
This rationale, coming hard on the heels of the Staklinski case,35
in which the court confirmed an arbitration award ordering the
specific performance of a contract for personal services, raises a
serious question as to whether the Court has become "an administrative rubber stamp over an arbitrator's determination. .. rather
[than] a court of equity applying equitable principles and enjoy [ing]
a certain latitude of discretion." 36
28 See, e.g., Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach, 187 App. Div. 876, 176
N.Y. Supp. 447 (2d Dep't 1919); McDonough v. Southern Ore. Mining Co.,'
177 29Ore. 136, 159 P.2d 829 (1945).
Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895).
3o Grayson-Robinson Stores v. Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d
377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960).
32 Id. at 139, 168 N.E.2d at 380, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 307.
32
1d. at 139, 168 N.E.2d at 379, 202 N.Y.S2d at 307.
33 POMEa O, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 23 (3d ed. 1926).
34 Grayson-Robinson- Stores v. Iris Constr. Corp., supra note 32, at 137,
168 N.E.2d at 378-79, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 306.
35 Matter of Staklinski, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541
(1959). See also 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 963-65 (1959).
36 Id. at 167, 160
N.E2d at 82, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 545-46 (dissenting
opinion). See also 28 FoRDHAA L. REv. 809 (1960).
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There can be no doubt that the court must be troubled at
the prospect of having to confirm arbitration awards calling for
specific performance in situations where, had the matter appeared
directly before the court, it might have denied the petition on
traditional discretionary grounds. 37 It would seem that the problem
might be considerably relieved by amending Article 84 of the Civil
Practice Act to provide that in any matter before an arbitrator
where he may order specific performance, the execution of which
would involve considerable supervision, the arbiter be a technically
qualified person, fully capable of and responsible for the enforcement of his award; or, in the alternative, that he have full power to
retain such qualified parties to settle disputes which might arise
during the ordered performance. It goes without saying that the
arbiter's award would always be subject to confirmation by the
court. It appears probable that such amendment would relieve the
courts from the possibility of long and onerous supervision, inject a
certain degree of stability into construction litigation, encourage
arbitration in this area, and lastly, remove what is considered in
some quarters to be an assault on the traditional discretionary power
of courts of equity.

CORPORATIONS EFICIARY OF REAL

BUSINESS CORPORATION HELD PROPER BENPROPERTY

TRUsT.-Defendant,

a business cor-

poration; proposed a liquidation plan calling for the exchange of the
corporate realty for trust certificates to be issued to the stockholders by trustees, who were to hold title to the real property,
collect its income, and distribute the net income to the holders of
the trust certificates. Plaintiff, one of three corporate stockholders
of defendant corporation, sought a judgment declaring that the
trust agreement was invalid on the ground that business corporations cannot be beneficiaries of trusts of realty. The Supreme
Court, Special Term, upholding the validity of the trust agreement,
held that a business corporation may be the beneficiary of a real
property trust. Alcon Corp. v. Ackerman, 26 Misc. 2d 678, 207
N.Y.S.2d 137 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
Prior to the instant case, the law in New York appeared to be
that a business corporation could not be the beneficiary of a real
property trust.1 Although a charitable corporation, by statute, can
37 Matter of Publishers' Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S2d 401 (1st
Dep't 1952).
1 In the Matter of Norton's Estate, 7 Misc. 2d 342, 343, 155 N.Y.S.2d 838,
839 (Surr. Ct. 1956) ; In the Matter of DeForest's Estate, 147 Misc. 82, 86,

